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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Section 
78-2a-3(2)(h) of the Utah Code. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice 
of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 
30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a) 
Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or 
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion 
is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the 
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither 
the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in 
providing the relevant portions of the transcript. Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, Rule 11(e)(2) 
Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a 
criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under 
these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney 
fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the 
party or by the party's attorney. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(a) 
Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or 
not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one 
interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in 
the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, 
motion, brief or other paper. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(b) 
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STATEMENT OF CASE, COURSE OF 
PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION IN COURT 
The Plaintiff, Mark Plaskon (hereafter "Plaskon"), filed this action on November 21, 
1989 to recover damages he claimed to have sustained as a result of the Respondents' (hereafter 
"Double D") alleged conversion of his personal property. In his Complaint, Plaskon alleged that 
Double D wrongfully sold certain items of his property which had been stored in the Double D 
Storage Garage, a self-storage facility owned by Double D. Plaskon claimed that Double D sold 
his property without giving him proper notice and without following proper procedures. Double 
D answered Plaskon's Complaint and raised the defense of "lack of standing to sue," among 
others. 
On October 4,1990, the matter was tried without a jury before the Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby. After hearing the evidence presented by both parties, Judge Cornaby found that there 
was no contract between the parties. As a result of finding a lack of privity of contract, Judge 
Cornaby ruled that Plaskon did not have standing to sue Double D and dismissed Plaskon's 
claims. 
On or about November 20,1990, Plaskon filed a Notice of Appeal, complaining that the 
Trial Court had ignored evidence which supported the existence of a contract between himself 
and Double D. On November 22,1991, the Court of Appeals reversed the Trial Court's ruling 
and found that the lower court erred "in finding that no contract existed between Plaintiff and 
Double D." Based on the Court's further finding that Double D's sale of Plaskon's property was 
not conducted pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 38-3-1, et seq. (1988), the Court of 
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Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded for a determination of the damages incurred by 
Plaskon. 
On February 17,1993, this matter came before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott for trial 
on the issue of Plaskon's damages. After hearing the evidence, Judge Memmott granted Plaskon 
judgment in the amount of $1,392.98, plus ten percent (10%) prejudgment interest from the date 
of the sale of the decoys, June 10,1988, through March 4,1993.1 However, the Court refused to 
award any damages for Plaskon's alleged loss of business income. 
On or about March 10,1994, Plaskon filed a Motion To Reconsider, wherein he asked the 
Court to reconsider its refusal to award him loss of business income (See Addendum). In the 
form of a signed Minute Entry, the Court denied Plaskon's Motion on September 12,1994 (See 
Addendum). On that same date, the Court also signed a Judgment, Order and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, prepared by Plaskon's attorney, which summarized Judge Memmott's 
February 17,1993 ruling in the above matter (See Addendum). 
Although Judge Memmott had signed a Minute Entry denying Plaskon's request for lost 
business income, Plaskon submitted an Order Denying Motion to Reconsider to the Judge on 
March 6,1995 (See Addendum). The Order was signed on that date. 
On April 5,1995, Plaskon filed his Notice of Appeal (See Addendum). 
On June 21,1995, Double D filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion for Summary Disposition, arguing that Plaskon's appeal was not filed in a timely matter 
lrThe Court calculated Plaskon's damages based upon the amount for which he initially 
purchased the decoys. 
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and that, accordingly, Plaskon's appeal should be dismissed and Double D awarded attorney fees 
and court costs. 
On October 2,1995, Chief Justice Michael D. Zimmerman deferred ruling on Double D's 
Motion for Summary Disposition until further consideration. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Defendants (hereafter "Double D") are the owners of the Double D Storage 
Garages (a self-storage facility), which are located in Bountiful, Utah. (Tr. at 67.) 
2. During the period from August 1,1986 through July 11,1987, Plaskon resided 
with his girlfriend, Paulette McFarland, in Bountiful, Utah. (Tr. at 28, 32.) 
3. On July 11, 1987, Ms. McFarland contacted one of the Defendants, Carma 
Jenkins, concerning the rental of storage space in the Double D storage facility. Ms. McFarland 
indicated that she was having problems with her boyfriend, Mr. Plaskon, and wanted to move 
him out of her home. She contacted Double D while Plaskon was out of town. (Tr. at 67-70.) 
4. Ms. McFarland agreed to rent space 108 in the storage facility and signed a rental 
agreement. The rental agreement provided for rent of $40.00 per month and a $2.00 key deposit. 
(Defendant's Ex. 1; Tr. at 33-35.) 
5. Ms. McFarland further indicated that she was only renting the facility for one 
month and that Plaskon would need to make arrangements with Double D if he wanted to keep 
his things stored for a longer period. In accordance with her statement, Ms. McFarland signed 
another document bearing Mr. Plaskon's name which stated: 
I, Mark J. Plaskon, agree to rent storage unit 108 for a period of one month for a 
total amount of $40.00 plus $2.00 key deposit. 
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The $2.00 key deposit will be returned upon receipt of key and notification that 
tenant has vacated unit. 
Ms. McFarland signed this document in Mr. Plaskon's name and later gave him a 
copy. (Tr. at 33-35, 38, 67-70; Plaintiffs Ex. 2.) 
6. After Ms. McFarland had rented space 108, she proceeded to move several duck 
decoys, which belonged to Plaskon, into the storage unit. (Tr. at 45, 47.) 
7. Mr. Plaskon's property stayed in the storage facility until August of 1988. Double 
D testified that during this time, Mr. Plaskon did not contact them for any reason nor did he pay 
any rent. During this same period of time, Double D attempted to locate Mr. Plaskon to 
determine what he desired to do with his property. Double D was unsuccessful in its efforts. 
(Tr. at 73-76, 86-87, 90, 93-94, 96.) 
8- In August of 1988, and after having failed to receive any rental payments or 
direction from Mr. Plaskon as to what should be done with the property, Double D sold the duck 
decoys contained in the storage facility. The decoys were sold for the amount of $575.00. The 
rent owing at that time was approximately $610.00. (Tr. at 72-79, 96,104.) 
9. In November of 1988, Plaskon went to the storage facility and found that his 
decoys were gone. He confronted Double D and was told that the decoys had been sold to cover 
past due rent. This suit then followed. (Tr. at 93-94.) 
10. On February 17,1993, more than three years after Plaskon initiated this matter, 
the Honorable Jon M. Memmott awarded Plaskon damages in the amount of $1,392.98, plus 
10% prejudgement interest. (R. at 129.) However, the Court denied Plaskon any damages for his 
alleged loss of business income. (R. at 141-143.) 
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11. On March 10,1994, more than one year after Judge Memmott's ruling, Plaskon's 
attorney filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's refusal to grant Plaskon damages for loss of 
business income. (R. at 151.) The Court denied Plaskon's Motion on September 12,1994, in a 
signed Minute Entry. (R. at 162). On the above date, the Court also signed a Judgment, Order 
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which summarized the Court's holdings regarding 
Plaskon's damages. (R. at 153.) 
12. On April 5,1995, almost one year after Judge Memmott denied Plaskon's Motion 
to Reconsider and signed the Order regarding Plaskon's damages, Plaskon filed an appeal from 
the Trial Court to the Appellate Court. (R. at 165.) 
13. Double D has incurred attorney fees in defending this untimely appeal, which has 
been brought in violation of Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaskon's appeal should be dismissed because it was not filed in a timely manner. 
However, if Plaskon's appeal is not dismissed, the Trial Court's judgments should be affirmed 
on appeal for the following reasons. First, Plaskon's arguments are not supported by the record, 
inasmuch as he failed to request a trial transcript pursuant to Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Second, the Trial Court's award of damages to Plaskon, based upon the 
decoys' value at the time they were initially purchased by Plaskon, was proper, in that the 
Court's findings and conclusions are well supported by the record. Furthermore, Plaskon's 
request for punitive damages is improper on appeal inasmuch as he failed to initially raise such 
issue at trial. Third, the Trial Court properly denied Plaskon's request for compensatory 
damages, in the form of lost business income, because Plaskon failed to establish his lost profits 
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with reasonable certainty. Finally, this Court should award Double D damages based upon the 
frivolous nature of Plaskon's appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS PLASKON'S APPEAL AS UNTIMELY 
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that: 
[I]n a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the Trial 
Court to the Appellate Court, the Notice of Appeal required by Rule 3 shall be 
filed with the clerk of the Trial Court within thirty (30) days after the date of entry 
of the Judgment or Order appealed. 
Although the Trial Court entered judgment in this matter on September 13,1994, Plaskon 
failed to file this appeal until April 5,1995, in direct violation of Rule 4(a). 
Plaskon argues that he had no obligation to file an appeal until thirty days following the 
Trial Court's signing of an Order denying his Motion to Reconsider, despite the fact that the 
Trial Court denied Plaskon's Motion in a signed Minute Entry on September 12,1994. Plaskon 
reasons that the statute of limitations was tolled until the Court signed an Order formally 
dismissing his Motion. Plaskon's argument is contrary to established Utah case law. In fact, the 
Utah Supreme Court has held that "[a] signed minute entry may be a final order for purposes of 
appeal. . . [if] 'the ruling specifies with certainty a final determination of the rights of the parties 
and is susceptible of enforcement.'" Dove v. Cude. 710 P.2d 170,171 n. 1 (Utah 1985) (quoting 
Cannon v. Keller. 692 P.2d 740, 740 n. 1 (Utah 1984)). See also McNair v. Havward. 666 P.2d 
321, 328 n. 6 (Utah 1983). 
The signed Minute Entry in this matter was a final order for purposes of appeal because it 
specified with certainty that there was no good cause shown in Plaskon's Motion to Reconsider 
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regarding the issue of lost profits. (R. At 162.) The Minute Entry was also susceptible of 
enforcement because the parties were put on notice that the Court would not reconsider its failure 
to award Plaskon compensatory damages for his alleged loss of business income. Accordingly, 
Plaskon's appeal should have been filed on or before October 12,1994, within thirty days after 
the Trial Court signed the Minute Entry. 
Plaskon attempted to correct his failure to file a timely appeal by forwarding an Order to 
Judge Jon M. Memmott, for the purpose of formally denying his Motion. (R. at 163.) 
Significantly, Plaskon did not file this Order until March 6,1995, approximately six months after 
the Judge signed the Minute Entry. Plaskon's filing of an Order with the Court at such a late 
date was nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to circumvent the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In fact, under Plaskon's rationale, he could have waited another two or three years to 
file an Order with the Court and would have still preserved his ability to appeal the Court's 
decision. This Court should not tolerate such circumvention of the legal process nor allow 
Double D to be prejudiced by such an untimely appeal. 
Even if this Court decides that the above Minute Entry was not a final order for purposes 
of appeal, Plaskon was still obligated to file his appeal on or before October 13,1994. Utah case 
law provides that when a Motion to Reconsider is filed prior to the entry of a final judgment or 
order, the time for filing a Notice of Appeal is not extended because such a motion is "simply a 
reargument" of the issues raised by the parties at trial. Ron Shepherd, Inc. v. Sheilds, 882 P.2d 
650, 653-655 (Utah 1994). This is exactly what occurred in this case. Plaskon filed his Motion 
to Reconsider before Judge Memmott signed his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment and Order. Because Plaskon asked the Court to reconsider its ruling regarding loss of 
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business income in his Motion to Reconsider and because Plaskon brought this Motion before 
the Judge had entered its Findings and judgment on this case, Plaskon's Motion was nothing 
more than a reiteration of the arguments he presented to the Court at trial. Accordingly, Plaskon 
could only have properly appealed Judge Memmott's ruling within 30 days after the Trial Court 
entered its Findings and judgment on September 13,1994. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REFUSE TO HEAR PLASKON'S APPEAL 
BECAUSE HE FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS ARGUMENTS FOR 
APPEAL 
The Trial Court's findings should be presumed correct by this Court because Plaskon 
failed to provide the Court with a trial transcript, pursuant to Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, and failed to provide support in the record for his arguments. Rule 11(e)(2) 
provides: 
If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the 
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither 
the Court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's deficiencies in 
providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
Although Plaskon's Brief is replete with assertions that the Trial Court improperly weighed 
"uncontroverted testimony" and rendered improper holdings, Plaskon never supported his 
assertions with the record, as Rule 11(e)(2) mandates. Hence, although Plaskon purported to 
marshall evidence in his Brief, Plaskon failed to disprove the Trial Court's findings because he 
did not support his arguments with the record. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has said the following regarding the appellant's obligation 
under Rule 11(e)(2): 
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'If the appellant intents to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 
unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the 
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion.' In 
essence, Rule 11 directs counsel to provide this court with all evidence relevant to 
the issues raised on appeal. 'Where the record before us is incomplete, we are 
unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore presume that the 
verdict was supported by admissible and competent evidence.' 
Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998,1002 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting Smith v. Yuicich. 699 P.2d 
763, 765 (Utah 1985)). 
Inasmuch as Plaskon has failed to provide this Court with "an adequate record to preserve 
[his] arguments for review," Horton v. Gem State Mut. of Utah, 794 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah App. 
1990), and has, consequently, failed to "marshall all the evidence" to support his arguments, Id, 
his "claim[s] of error [are] 'merely . . . unsupported, unilateral allegation^]' which this Court 
should refuse to resolve. Horton at 849 (quoting State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-
Nine Dollars. 791 P.2d 213, 217 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS PROPER 
The general law regarding a Trial Court's award of damages is that "[i]f there is a 
reasonably certain basis for it in the evidence, a Trial Court's award of damages will be affirmed 
on appeal." Henderson v. For-Shor Co.. 757 P.2d 465, 468 (Utah App. 1988). In the present 
case, the Trial Court's award of damages to Plaskon, based upon the value of the decoys when 
Plaskon purchased them, was proper and should be affirmed on appeal because the Court's 
findings and conclusions regarding damages are well supported by the record. The Court did not 
randomly award damages at its discretion, but carefully considered all of the evidence and 
testimony brought before it in making its decision. In fact, after receiving all of the evidence on 
this issue, the Court determined that it could value the decoys in one of four ways. (R. at 127.) 
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After considering each of these possible valuations and the testimony preferred on each, the 
Court chose to value the decoys based upon the price they were initially purchased by the 
Plaintiff. (R. at 127.) Hence, the Court's decision was deliberately made only after considering 
all of the evidence before it and, accordingly, should be affirmed on appeal. 
Plaskon also argues that the Trial Court erred by failing to award him punitive damages. 
Because Plaskon has initially requested punitive damages on appeal, and not at trial, this Court 
should not consider Plaskon's request. "Generally, a [party] who fails to bring an issue before 
the trial court is barred from asserting it initially on appeal." State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 
922 (Utah App. 1991). See also State v. Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271 (Utah App. 1995), State v. 
Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913 (Utah App. 1992) and State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993). 
No exception should be made for Plaskon. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PLASKON 
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF ALLEGED FUTURE 
BUSINESS INCOME 
The Court's failure to award Plaskon damages for his alleged loss of business income was 
proper and completely consonant with Utah case law. Contrary to Plaskon's interpretation of the 
Court's holding in this regard, the Court based its decision on Plaskon's utter inability to give the 
Court a consistent figure upon which to base Plaskon's loss of business income, not upon the 
Court's finding, in Plaskon's words, that an award of future income was inappropriate because 
Plaskon's hunting business was an "avocation" rather than a "vocation." 
As the record illustrates, Plaskon failed to establish his lost profits with reasonable 
certainty. In fact, the Court noted that based upon the inconsistent figures provided in Plaskon's 
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testimony, tax return, affidavit, and interrogatories that "the Plaintiff really [didn't] have an 
accurate record of what his income was and that it really [was] an estimate." (R. at 141.) The 
Court continued, "I think that there's some question as to what the true level of income was for 
1986." (R. 141.) Based upon Plaskon's inability to provide the Court with an accurate statement 
of his income and his concomitant "lack of credibility," the Court could not have awarded 
Plaskon lost business income because such decision would be in opposition to an established 
body of Utah case law on this issue. 
In Utah the general rule is that "[l]ost profits must be established with reasonable 
certainty." Cook Associates. Inc. v. Warnick. 664 P.2d 1161,1165 (Utah 1983). However, 
because there are "so many factors of uncertainty" in establishing lost profits, "ordinarily profits 
to be realized in the future are too speculative to base an award of damages thereon." First Sec. 
Bank of Utah, N.A. v. J.B.J. Feedyards. Inc.. 653 P.2d 591, 596 (Utah 1982) (citing Howard v. 
Ostergaard. 515 P.2d 442, 445 (Utah 1973)). Based upon Plaskon's inconsistent testimony 
regarding his business income during the 1986 hunting season, the Court could make no other 
conclusion than that Plaskon's future profits were too speculative to be awarded. 
Plaskon's argument that the Court denied him an award of future profits because his 
hunting business was an "avocation" rather than a "vocation" is completely groundless. As the 
record indicates, the Court did refer to the part-time nature of Plaskon's business. (R. at 142.) 
However, in so doing the Court was not stating that future profits are only awarded when the 
business is a full-time operation. Rather, the Court referred to Plaskon's hunting business as 
more of a hobby than a profession. Plaskon's testimony demonstrated that his hunting business 
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was anything but an operation which functioned on a steady basis from year to year. In this 
regard the Court noted: 
. . . [F]or a number of reasons, including obtaining a new position in a job, marital 
problems, for a number of reasons the Plaintiff chose of his own accord not to 
continue the business. He had the opportunity to, if he desired to. But in 1987-88 
decided not to continue in the hunting or guide business. In 1988 again had the 
opportunity, if he had wanted, to contact the people to continue the business, but 
for reasons of his own choice, decided not to continue the business for the first 
part of the 1988 season. Therefore, the Court finds that while this was maybe not 
a vocation, it was more of an avocation of the Plaintiff, something that I think he 
clearly enjoyed doing, that he had skill. 
(R. at 142.) 
The Court's statement that Plaskon did not produce a net positive income figure further 
demonstrates that the Court relied on Utah case law in denying Plaskon lost business income, not 
upon the avocation versus vocation distinction. (R. at 142.) The general rule in Utah is that "[a] 
party is entitled to recover only lost net profits." Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 P.2d 773, 
774 (Utah 1986). In the record, Plaskon only introduced evidence, although inaccurate and 
inconsistent, of his gross income during the 1986 hunting season. However, Utah case law 
requires parties seeking lost future income to introduce evidence of their business' net profits "by 
computing the difference between the gross profits and the expenses that would be incurred in 
acquiring such profits." Id at 774. Plaskon failed to do so. Accordingly, inasmuch as "proof of 
lost gross profits does not afford courts a proper bases for a damage award, where there is no 
evidentiary basis on which to calculate net profits with reasonable certainty," the Court had a 
further basis upon which to properly deny Plaskon's request for net lost profits. Id 
V. THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD DOUBLE D DAMAGES FOR 
DEFENDING PLASKON'S FRIVOLOUS AND UNTIMELY APPEAL 
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Pursuant to Rule 33(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party is entitled to 
damages, in the form of single or double costs . . . and/or reasonable attorney fees, "if the court 
determines that a[n] . . . appeal taken . . . is either frivolous or for delay. "A frivolous appeal is 
one "that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reserve existing law," while an appeal taken for delay is one 
which is "interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the 
cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper." Utah Ct. App. R. 33(a). 
Plaskon's appeal is frivolous because it is not "well grounded in fact or law," Backstrom 
Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall. 751 P.2d 1157,1160 (Utah App. 1988), and was taken for delay 
because it was "'taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing/" will result '"in [the] delayed 
implementation of the judgment of the lower court/" has '"increased the costs of litigation/" and 
has '"dissipatfed] . . . the time and resources of the . . . Court.'" Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 
369 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Auburn Harpswell Ass'n. v. Day, 438 A.2d 234, 239 (Me. 1981). 
Plaskon's appeal was not only brought in an untimely manner, but it raises on appeal an issue 
which Plaskon never introduced at trial, it purposefully misinterprets the Trial Court's holding 
regarding lost business income by creating the "avocation" versus "vocation" distinction, it 
ignores Utah case law regarding compensatory damages and the Trial Court's discretion in 
awarding such damages, and its arguments are not supported in the record, as mandated in Rule 
11(e)(2). 
Based upon the above, Double D respectfully requests that this Court exercise its 
equitable powers by awarding Double D the a rney fees which it has incurred in defending 
14 
Plaskon's appeal. This appeal has done nothing to clarify the Trial Court's decision, but has 
served only to increase litigation costs, further harass Double D, and prolong a matter where the 
attorney fees involved far exceed the small amount of damages which have been awarded. 
Although "sanction[s]" for bringing a frivolous appeal [are] applied only in egregious cases . . . 
this is exactly the type of case where such sanctions are warranted. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 
P.2d 156,162 (Utah App. 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's Findings and Judgment were proper and consonant with Utah case law, 
including its denial of Plaskon's request for compensatory damages based upon the decoys' 
replacement value, punitive damages, and lost business income. Double D respectfully requests 
that Plaskon's appeal be dismissed as untimely and that Double D be awarded the attorney fees 
and court costs it has incurred in defending this frivolous appeal. 
DATED and SIGNED this _H day of February, 1996. 
HANKS & ROOKER, P.C. 
RORIHENDRIX 
Attorney for Defendants/Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee 
were mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on the ; f day of February, 1996, to the following: 
John T. Caine 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
16 
ADDENDUM 
17 
JOHN T. CAINE #053 6 of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2 568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
Telephone: (801) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK PLASKON, 
I1 I d J fit ! I I 
vs 
DARWIN HAYES, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW the Pla I ntiff above namedJP by and through his 
counsel, John T, Caj ne, and hereby moves the above enti tl ed Court 
t; o recoi isi dei: j ts deci si « :>i :i fo] 1 owl i ig a Ti: i al i i i tl ie a! x>v e mattei : 
i n February of 1993, i lot to award Plainti f f loss :>£ bi isiness 
income. 
That the Coin: t is urged to reconquer +-*& +-esHir^"v o^ Steve 
Brown who testified without opposil :iTr.=ui c* any 
wi ti less pr esei ited I : •} tl: :i,€ defense + II: i 
the Plal ntiff, Plaintiff's val ue > : .- .. : * . r, * c.i i 
Plaintiff ' s business fif " televisi on i nter vi ew. 
11 (Jt'ii ed tl ie 1 ""] a < e 
conflicting statements about his income, there is no question from 
che uncontradicted testimon1 ui Brown that PI a i nti ff h. ; t< I a :t c »3 ] ing 
business and one which ]..,.. r,,; had the decoys available, wou] < I have 
resulted in additional income to him during the periods set forth 
1 
*<z c 
'W*J yjlj 'J 
FILED IN CLERK'S 0* 
^ ^ > i $ £ p S 3 | | O I A H ! 
CJ.£~ 
C L E r , — 
By / ^ 
u i - , . . : " • . • • " . . , - • • • B Y it 
uE7iU\ \ OLizn;' 
*£ 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
r | , | ) [ I n H O n i 7 4 b l i i II 
in the litigation. 
Prior to appealing this matter Plaintiff desires the Court 
revisit that issue to determine whether or not the Court wants to 
amend its Judgment with respect to the issue of business income. 
DATED this 10th day of March, 1994^ 
v-^-x 
JOfflJ CAINE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Motion to Reconsider to counsel for the 
Defendant, Jim Hanks, Attorney at Law, 376 East 400 South #300, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage^prrepS*i4 ti^ i^ TTOl^ i day of 
March, 1994. 
.Secretary 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT 01' DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff MINUTE ENTRY 
September 12, 1994 
I Case No. 890746591 
Defendant. I 
Jon M. Memmott, Judge 
Kathy Potts, Clerk 
The Court has reviewed the Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider and finds there is no good 
cause shov " • c nun -.vill deny the Motion to Reconsider and has signed the Judgment 
_,aw on the above date. 
DISTRICT COURT JUPOF 
MARK PLASKON, 
v. 
DARWIN IIA'WiS, 
JOHN T. CAINE #0536 of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
r i lEDINC'-ERK'SOJ^CE 
r-M'i 
SEP 13 I I01 i l l 'S t 
CLERK, 'c'••;.' "y.-y-. 0::';i>: 
BY
 : £•¥--. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVISueOUNTY" ' 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK PLASKON, 
vs. 
DARWIN HAYES, 
Plaintiff, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 890,46591 
Defendant. 
The above entitled matter came on for Trial before the above 
•ntitled Com " >- Februai". . *• before the Honorable .:on 
CM Q 
g < 
- D 
O O 
Z CD _ 
Q 2 O 
- o 5 
D O oo 
CD O x -
C/) 2 < ® 
£ x t; T 
5 S? D * 
< < _- o> 
§ s 8 § 
without ., *-• t Laintif r *a.-i present .im represented t ^ 
counsel, Johi i. a^m*-- *-*-* r»efendai** 4 preser* •• 'our* *^.? 
represente . counse .„.-_. tie:.* . >: *. : 
testimony of the parties and arguments of counsel, a- the *ourt 
hciv i nq re.-oivprt v,u i« H j .* > rxh i hi 1: s IHMI tin <Y)uit liavniq heen fully 
advised :i i :i the premises and acknowledging an order of the Utah 
'•;>urt o' Appeal entered November 22, 199.1 finding that : :u 
Plaintiff and Defendant
 ;:-. iJsr. : arther finding that le . r t 
the PiaiiiLjLii 4 s decoys was ilot conducted pursuant tu it • "ode 
Annotated 3 8-3-] the case was therefore, remanded for 
determination of damages incurred b\ -.*•.•: ;-\ .-. int :.i" * . "That Court 
1 
having heard this hearing having in mind that decision and having 
heard the claim for damages now makes the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds with respect to the claim for damages as to 
the value of the decoys. 
1. That the Plaintiff did store the decoys at the 
storage unit owned by the Defendant. 
2. That the Defendant selling the decoys did not comply 
with the above referenced statute in notifying the Plaintiff or 
bidding or in selling as a private sale. 
3. That the Court has received evidence of four (4) 
different values: 
a) The first value, the 1993 retail value; 
b) The 1988 resale value; 
c) The value that Plaintiff paid for the decoys 
initially; and 
d) The amount paid for the decoys by James Oswald. 
4. In assessing damages the Court finds that the 
appropriate value to be assigned to the decoys is the amount 
Plaintiff paid Flambo for the decoys which was $1,722.35 for all 
but approximately 90 of the decoys. 
5. Based upon interpellation and the type of decoys the 
Court finds that the value of the decoys was as follows: $62.20 
for two (2) dozen super magnum mallards, $29.65 for a dozen 
floater geese, $312 for four (4) dozen mighty magnum Canada goose 
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3 
shells, $156 for hovering wi ndsocks and $56.10 for si imi magnum 
decoys issue Ml lor a total together of $2,3 38.30, 
6. As a result of storage, forty percei 
decoys deteriorated and were not useable. 
7. i nt i t f * \e risk ot storing the 
decoys over two •;. summers and had the opportunity at any time to 
J> the jjiij. L ^ remove those decoys. 
G That pi a i nt - i] cl h a ve beei: i awar e that t::l: le 1 l = .a !:: :i i l 
: \u strr.i^i- un: - damage the decoys and :>ear- v.t* 
is . , . Uiem for over four (4) mo r' *' without 
paying \ • » i. * i - . invoking on the decoys. '" •- -~ 
T'tions v.*vf- net pruder' • ler the circumstances, therefore, rru 
. : . , : » • : • "cent (40'f.) I oi;s due to aelerioidiioh 
-•is trie responsibility of riu» Plaintiff. 
Trie Court *~;; :* **'" • aspect to the claim for loss of income. 
1. That: Plai i i t:i f f' s tes tl iriony was tl lat i n the 1 :n ii iti i lg 
season 19 8 6-8? he conducted approximate1y n i nety (9 0) hunt ing 
t: r i p s f o i: w I: i i c h 1 i e r e c e i v e d $ 5 0 a t r i p f o r a t o t a ] o f $ 4 , 5 0 0 
2. That Plaii rtiff further testifies tl la t the 
Plaintiff's i ncome tax retur n l_- the year 1 9 B H showed his income 
from tha t : i it $60 3 
3 That the Defendants Tr^errogatories indicated that 
Plaintiff made $] ,000 a week duriny the aforesaid period or 
approximately $8,000, , ~ 
4 Tha t the Court finds that the Plaintiff testimony 
1 a *" k s c r e d i b i 1 i 1: ;r b e c a u s e o f t h e i i :i c o n s * v . * • t e >. a b o v e 
statements and it appears to the Court that the Plaintiff does not 
have an accurate record of what his income was and that his 
figures are an estimate. 
5. The Court further finds that no matter which of the 
amounts was accurate, these were gross income figures and 
Defendant had expenses based upon that income which impacted his 
income. 
6. Concerning the Plaintifffs income for 1987 for a 
number of reasons, including obtaining a new position in a job, 
marital problems, the Plaintiff chose, on his own accord, not to 
continue his business. He had the opportunity to if he desired 
to. That in 1987-88 the Plaintiff decided not to continue in the 
hunting or guide business; in 1988 again the Plaintiff had the 
opportunity if he wanted to contact people to continue the 
business, but reasons of his own choice, decided not to continue 
the business for the first part of the 1988 season. 
7. That the Plaintiff had skill and enjoyed hunting and 
taking others hunting, but this was never intended to be a full 
time job and was more of a avocation rather than a vocation. 
8. Therefore, because of the above facts, the Court 
does not any net positive income. 
WHEREFORE, from the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Court concludes as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the actual value of the decoys and other personal 
property items stored was $2,338.30. That this value should be 
4 
reduced by f o r t y p e r c e n t (40° i er **•< ' *sis. *' :t M.PY v- r damaged 
-- -r t * diiu a c t i o n s ui the r x a m t i f f i n ti - l a s e 
<i ; ir: a j , , . u i i a , M i s e t of ?10 which *s t h e "<rtr d i f f e r e n c e re 
• 1u awarding Judgment from Plaintiff againsr the 
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2. That further, based upon the foregoing Findings the court 
awards no damages for 1 oss of income. 
3 The Court awards no attorney's fees to either party. 
D A T E i : » 1:1 :i i s f Q^ day < if j^jpk , 1994 , 
JON MEMMOTT 
District Court Judye 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT 
TO: DEI EI - - > : 
YOU w; LI. PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned Attorney r r 
P l a i n t i f f • • - : • . ; 
Conclusion .- .,; ; o .J* . : *• .* ..rt Jud^e lor h*> signature 
upon the expirati . * :ivt- v* dr.vs Ji ->i *h«- .i<ite "his Notice is 
ma - . . 
the Rules of Practice i n the District 
tah , KindlVr< govern youj^self accordingly. 
lay of \^\u^4-Tfl^>L \\ , 1#94, 
pursuant 
Courts f • 
DA 
\< u: *-
' .* State L 
L 
M*U. i si < ^ ^ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to 
counsel for the Defendant, Jim Hanks, Attorney at Law, 376 East 
400 South #300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid this 
day of , 1994. 
PAM PONTIUS, Secretary 
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JOHN T. CAINE #0536 of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 399-4191 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
;vi A\i I' u r iii iu-1 
MARK PLASKON, 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
DARWIN HAYES, Civil No. 890746591 
Defendant. 
S 
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Thp above entitled matter came on for Trial before the above 
en", r -- J cou: t <™ F^hrnarv I'tu he tore the Honorabh-* Ion 
lemmott, one ;l ^ ^ fudges t the above entitled Court, sitting 
i 
'w i thou t „i 11 • * wrif, prr")f»nt <IJIII r e p r e s e n t e d by 
counsel , Johi .-djnt^ anJ Defendant was present In Court , and 
represented by counsel , James Hanks. The Court ; i f te r hea r ing the 
* . - -.< a i id LIU 
having received various; exhibits . , M \ >. t ,a\ :r 4 . t=* -uiLy 
idvised - premises and acknowledging -ii r * - *~ah 
-rt. :^ Appea.. entered November - : ;ie 
rial Court errei. »<mi.na Jontract existed between the 
" - . '• " - a 1 1C <* - ~ r * • ' • - r • ,. : : 
• u- Plaintiff's decoys was * * onducteu pursuant T. ;.;idh Code 
Annotated 3 8 - - * - ;herefore, remanded for 
deter mi ii.it. i un ol damages i m Tit red by the PI >-i i nti 11 , '"["hat Courl 
JUDGMENT ENTERED nft'2T079 3 
having heard this hearing having in mind that decision and having 
heard the claim for damages and heretofore made and entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes the following 
Judgment and Order: 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
1. That the actual value of the decoys and other personal 
property items stored was $2,338.30. That this value should be 
reduced by forty percent (40%) on the basis that they were damaged 
due to the responsibility and actions of the Plaintiff in the case 
and an additional offset of $10 which is the net difference in the 
rent due, thus awarding Judgment from Plaintiff against the 
Defendant in the sum of $1,392.98 plus prejudgment ten percent 
(10%) interest from the date of the sale, June 10, 1988 through 
March 4, 1993. Post-judgment interest will then be awarded from 
the date of the signing of this Order. 
2. That further, based upon the foregoing Findings the Court 
awards no damages for loss of income. 
3. The Court awards no attorney's fees to either party. 
DATED this \&& day of Aug&st', 1994. 
JON MEMMOTT 
District Court Judge 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT 
TO: DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL, JIM HANKS: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned Attorney for 
Plaintiff will submit the above and foregoing Judgment and Order 
to the District Court Judge for his signature upon the expiration 
2 
f -rren bjectior ; : lied pi:c*r - * ir - :nie pursuant * - K. 
of the Rules of practice in the District Courts of the state of 
1 Jtah. Kli idly govern yoursel f accqrdi i iqly, ^ 7: 
DATED this 
^ ^ -
Attorney for Plaintiff 
c-A-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that ' mai 1 ed a true and correct copy of the 
above a foregoing J udgment and Order to counsel for the 
Defendar* : . n Hanks, attorney at Law, 3 76 East 400 South #300, 
Sal t a i i , pos t a qe , • p'Fe'pa da;; :::>f 
h-S-tjj.iJ • 1934 
J PAM ~"PtfNTIUS, S e c r e t a r y 
3 
JOHN T. CAINE #0536 of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 3 1 
BY 
\ 5i ni «ot; 
£ 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK PLASKON, 
vs. 
DARWIN HAYES, 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
Civi ] No. 89 0746591 
Defendant. 
The above enti t] eci matter came : -i i foi : 1: iear :ii i lg on: i 
the Plaintiff to reconsider the Court's decision arid te re-
evaluate the evidence with respect to the i ssue of economic damage 
cinicl t h e < mi ir I h a * i I I H I r e"< » 1 " " " » i I <»;: i ic • il .1 >s « 1 1: i< I t l : le t equi ".. I N l ed , 
having considered the matter, now hereby makes the foliowinq 
Order: 
Thai Plaint, ill us Mol 1 n to Recons . 3pr is . *.ed. 
DATED this ID - day of February, 1995. 
JON MEMMOTT 
District Court Judge 
% 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT 
TO: DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL, JIM HANKS: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned Attorney for 
Plaintiff will submit the above and foregoing Order to the 
District Court Judge for his signature upon the expiration of five 
(5) days from the date this Notice is mailed to you unless written 
objection is filed prior to that time pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the 
Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the State of Utah. 
Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this ^ Y ) day of Febr 
J&S(N T/T CAINE 
Attosdey for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing Order to counsel for the Defendant, Jim Hanks, 
Attorney at Law, 376 East 400 South #300, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, postage prepaid this C y day 
)NTIUS, Secretary 
3 
JOHN T. CAINE #0536 of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 399-4191 
FiLED IN CLERK'S OK?-Cr 
DAVIS >:0L;HT"'. :'v'-
APR 5 10 32 AM ' 35 
Cl.EF.K. CKL- iii.Sl. 00'JRT 
BY 
DEPUTY CLERK 
If! TIII'I S E C O N D J U D T C T a T , D I S T R I C T C O U R T 
STATE .., , *,n COUNTY OF DAVIS 
MARK PLASKON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DARWIN HAYES, ET AL., 
Defendar. L 
Civil No. 890746591 
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COMES NOW 
a t t o r n e y , J ohi i ^ <t- ano ierrn a rt ' ce * ' 
appeal t h e D e c i s i c - *<J^  irM ^emmott, rendered hereor • +l-c 
above en1 il I«M| cast1 en MI a b n i t l;he 6 th c^ lay of March, 1995 , t o t 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this 5th day oi ,*. 
( 
JOHN T. feXl^Ey 
At torney f o r P l a i n t i f f 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mai led a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoinc r , •& o I: Appeal to counse] foi the 
• * i ley < i I I n;; , I I H hast 4 no iu ait .h #3 00, 
Salt Lake Cit\ - postage prepaid this 5th day of April, 
1995. 
—-SECK ETARY 
